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Introduction
Russia's sudden invasion of Georgia in 2008, its annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and subsequent infiltrations in Ukraine including the constant testing of European territorial air and sea defences raised awareness in the West "about the possibility of military attack and occupation" (Blockmans and Faleg 2015, p. 2) and thereby also sparked a new round of debates regarding NATO's future and how the "the return of war on Europe's border" would affect the Alliance's political and institutional relationship with the EU (European Union 2015, p. 11).
For some, this is the continuation of a debate that started with the end of the Cold War when, in the face of the demise of the Soviet Union, NATO seemed to have lost its primary purpose.
At the time, structural realists declared NATO a "disappearing thing" (Waltz 1990 cited in Hellmann and Wolf 1993, p. 3) while liberal institutionalists saw a window of opportunity for the Alliance to change and adapt to a changing security environment (see e.g. Haftendorn, Keohane & Wallender 1999) , an effort that some portrayed as a "metamorphosis from Cold War nightmare to post-Cold War daydream" (Booth and Wheeler 1992, p. 21) . As part of a comprehensive re-make and demonstration of its continued relevance, NATO attempted a transformation from classic military alliance into an organisation with broader political ambitions, adding to its role of security guarantor for Europe the one of "democracy promoter"
and "global interventionist" and thereby converging somewhat with EU efforts to develop its own comprehensive security and foreign policy profile (Wolff 2009, p. 476) . Meanwhile, the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) had to be couched as something that was not aimed to openly challenge the role of NATO and would instead focus on complementing it.
The discussion surrounding NATO's utility was rekindled in the context of the RussiaGeorgian war in 2008, peaked again in 2009 on the occasion of the Alliance's sixtieth anniversary and, more recently, in the aftermath of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The lines of the debate are reasonably well-rehearsed: NATO has outlived its usefulness, especially in a world with many new security threats that often emanate from non-state actors, and it is in strategic limbo following the U.S. pivot towards Asia and the long-standing failure of other Alliance members, including large EU member states, to adequately support NATO (Carpenter 2016 ). The riposte is just as well-rehearsed: NATO remains relevant because it has proven that it can adapt and operate "out of area" and, with strong American leadership, the Alliance will not only endure, with adaptation, but contribute to a more secure world (Atlantic Council 2016) . There are of course more nuanced accounts of why and how NATO needs to adapt and to what (e.g. Hallams, Ratti and Zyla 2014; Webber and Hyde-Price 2016) . However, the salient point here is that the need for NATO to redefine its raison d'être has been on the agenda since the end of the Cold War, along with the question of whether the Europeans would build their own, autonomous system of security governance alongside it and how this would affect EU-NATO cooperation.
At the official level there are increasingly long protestations of NATO's continued relevance. 1 The EU, at least in part, acknowledges this by agreeing that NATO has been "the bedrock of Euro-Atlantic security for almost 70 years" and that "it remains the strongest and most effective military alliance in the world" (EUGS 2016, p. 36) . However, the EU's Global Strategy also reflects the institutional membership asymmetries, noting that EU-NATO relations shall not prejudice the security and defence policies of the EU's six non-NATO members. 2 This then leads to some careful language on EU-NATO cooperation, whereby cooperation will be deepened "in complementarity, synergy, and full respect for the institutional framework, inclusiveness and decision-making autonomy of the two" (EUGS 2016, p. 20) . Away from the niceties of official communications and communiqués, post-Cold War relations between the EU and NATO have been cloaked in ambivalence, and since 2004 in particular they are best described as "formal non-cooperation" at the political level, with various informal forms of ad hoc cooperation in the field (see Gebhard, Smith and Tomic in this volume; Graeger and Haugevik 2013; Gebhard and Smith 2015; Graeger 2016; Himmrich and Raynova 2017) . 3 The difficulties associated with formal cooperation between the EU and NATO are often ascribed to the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the Union in 2004, thus institutionalising differences over the Cyprus issue between the respective organisations (Tzimitras and Hatay 2016, 7-8) . This, however, over-simplifies the picture since the two organisations have been tacitly competing for a middle-ground in security, concentrating on crisis management since the end of the Cold War. The lack of an obvious territorial threat undermined the centrality of NATO's Article 5 (mutual self-defence in case of territorial aggression) and led the Alliance to stress its relevance with regard to a wider set of security challenges. The EU's relatively young security and defence policy (which later became the CSDP) was developing in the same direction with the assumption of a broad set of peacekeeping activities from the Western European Union with the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1999. Hence even prior to 2004 questions of institutional prestige and even survival were tied up with issues of the appropriate levels of cooperation and potential overlap (and, behind closed doors, competition).
Aspects of de jure formal EU-NATO cooperation continued between the organisations at the civilian and military levels (the latter often comprising dual-hatted representatives) but with very restrictive agendas, limited mainly to the Western Balkans, and the exchange of classified information. De facto cooperation is however limited by the asymmetrical membership of the organisations as it relates to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, which is why the emphasis tends to be on more pragmatic and informal modes of cooperation. The prevalent "formal non-cooperation" has contributed to the lack of "respective strategic specificity" (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2015, p. 153) Elsewhere in Brussels, the Ukraine crisis struck the EU at an extremely vulnerable time, came too late to have a substantive impact on the situation. The ENP, and with it the EU's Eastern Partnership (EaP), now had to contend with the reality that borders that were designed to be deliberately fuzzy had in fact become clearly defined and militarised. 5 The succession of external shocks, combined with institutional navel-gazing, led to the build-up of an existential crisis within the EU, raising fundamental questions about the bloc's regional and international role (see also Duke 2017 […] one state perceives as a threat to its own security or prosperity its neighbours' integration into military alliances or economic groupings that are closed to it. This exclusivity is the source of the dilemma: it transforms integration, a positive-sum process by definition, into a zero-sum game for the state that is excluded from the integration initiatives offered to its neighbours. As with the security dilemma, the intentions of the neighbours or the backers of integration initiatives need not be hostile to the state in question for an integration dilemma to materialise.
Even if actions are not intended to produce outward-facing effects at all, they may even be Evera's (1999) idea of abrupt balancing, for a status quo oriented power like Russia, forward aggression constitutes more of an exceptional move, and one that bears the risk of self-defeat.
In this sense, Russia had to turn to aggression temporarily to intimidate its western neighbours and thereby prevent more robust action in the future but Putin would eventually nevertheless recognise the more beneficial long-term effects of defensive balancing.
Meanwhile, offensive realist John Mearsheimer (2014) suggested that "Putin's pushback should have come as no surprise", neither in principle nor in terms of his specific tactical approach. The annexation of Crimea was clearly aimed at pre-empting potential secession and the loss of key military bases. Moreover, it was a direct reaction and response to US and European leaders' attempts "to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia's border" (p. 77), a spiral logic that can of course be easily reversed to explain as well as justify NATO's vigorous response ever since (see further below). Putin would -and will -continue to seek opportunities for confrontation, and use the deterrent effect of the threat of further forward aggression n short, defensive and offensive variants of the security dilemma differ in their assumptions about the desirable and more effective way of securing a state's interests:
through defensive balancing on the one hand and aggressive forward expansion and conquest on the other. The question is then whether NATO's specific response, too, was simply the manifestation of such a "security dilemma" or whether it was based on a focused, strategic assessment of specific situational imperatives ("risks"). The following section will explore these two competing explanations before we return to a discussion of how an "integration dilemma" might indeed have evolved between the West and Russia.
A classic security dilemma?
Although events One of the most influential, if alarmist, vindicators was a RAND Report which suggested that Tallinn and Riga could be overrun by Russian forces within 60 hours. The report concluded, "As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members" (Shlapak and Johnson 2016, p. 4) . A programme screened on BBC in The concerted European approach of the six EaP members (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) may suggest the appearance of an "everything but Russia" bloc but they are marked by enormous differences in perspective and enthusiasm for moving closer to the EU (Charap and Troitskiy 2013, 53) . Belarus has traditionally kept the EaP at arm's length with little enthusiasm for the EU's normative dialogue, especially when it comes to democracy or the rule of law. Azerbaijan is also unenthusiastic about EU efforts to bolster civil society or for discussions on human rights. The economic buoyancy provided through its oil wealth has also contributed to its lacklustre embrace of the EU. The argument is not that the EU, NATO and Russia are about to engage in competition over Turkey, but it is more symptomatic of the ability of President Erdogan to exploit the geopolitical (and geoeconomic) sensitivities surrounding the integration dilemma, while at the same time Turkey is anxious to escape the exclusivity that lies at the heart of the dilemma. But, by so doing, Turkey risks deepening the integration dilemma with regard to the Caucasus, with
Armenia opting for the EEU, Georgia with strong preferences for the EU and Azerbaijan trying to avoid close ties with either. It is also possible that proxy integration dilemmas could surface further afield to Central Asia. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan's desire to keep all parties at arm's length might also suggest growing sensitivity to the negative consequences of the integration and security dilemmas. This suggests that longer-term stability probably lies in a wide-ranging Eurasian accommodation that goes beyond fealty to either the EU or the EEU.
One of the paradoxes of the integration dilemma is that it is no longer about actual membership of the EU or NATO, but about the perceived proxy influence that comes about through the respect ante chambers of the organisations. In the case of the EU this is the six EaP while for In Russian eyes, the interlocking expansion of the EU and NATO was part of the ongoing consolidation of the asymmetrical conclusion of the Cold War following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Putin made it clear at the Valdai International Discussion Club in 2014 that:
We have told our American and European partners that hasty backstage decisions, for example, on Ukraine's association with the EU, are fraught with serious risks to the economy. We didn't even say anything about politics; we spoke only about the economy, saying that such steps, made without any prior arrangements, touch on the interests of many other nations, including Russia as Ukraine's main trade partner, and that a wide discussion of the issues is necessary […] Russia does not need any kind of special, exclusive place in the world […] we simply want for our own interests to be taken into account and for our positions to be respected. (Putin 2014) It is easy to ascribe the apparent American tin ear regarding Russia's concerns about the emerging post-cold war international order to the administrations of George W. Bush and his neo-conservative advisors. However, such polarising difficulties were by no means confined to his administration. For instance, the decision to develop a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)
capability was made at the 2010 Lisbon Summit with an interim capability being declared two years later. The rationale was to provide full coverage and protection for NATO's European population, territory and forces from ballistic missile threats emanating from beyond the EuroAtlantic area. In spite of remonstrations that the BMD capability "is purely defensive and not directed against Russia", it was never seen as such by Putin (NATO: 2016a) . He saw it as "an attempt to destroy the strategic balance, to change the balance of forces in their favour not only to dominate, but to have the opportunity to dictate their will to all: to their geopolitical competition and, I believe, to [America's] allies as well" (Putin: 2015) .
There is no doubt that the Obama administration and NATO's Secretary-General believed in their remonstrations, but what is questionable is the resistance to heed Russian warnings that NATO and EU actions were seen as essentially geopolitical in nature, even if both avowed otherwise. John Mearsheimer (2014, p. 78) referred to this kind of apparent disconnect as the "liberal delusion". He argued that:
Elites in the United States and Europe have been blindsided by events only because they subscribed to a flawed view of international politics. They tend to believe that the logic of realism holds little relevance in the twenty-first century and that Europe can be kept whole and free on the basis of such liberal principles as the rule of law, economic interdependency, and democracy.
Mearsheimer's argument suggests that the EU and NATO were pursuing post-modernist agendas, convinced of their own normative superiority and of the low likelihood of armed aggression between Russia, the EU and NATO -until Russia's aggression in Crimea and proxy involvement in Ukraine made this untenable. In this interpretation, the EU and NATO were naïve and were unable to accept Putin's counter-narrative other than that of an unenlightened "modern" authoritarian nemesis. Alternatively, one could argue that the EU and NATO were quite aware of the geopolitical stakes. Behind the normative façade one would expect to find careful calculations of the risks linked to broader strategic goals that ultimately promoted a specific approach to global governance. There is only cursory evidence to back this up stemming from public statements, such as that emanating from NATO's 1999 New Strategic
Concept, which saw the enlargement of NATO as serving "the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance, strengthen its effectiveness and cohesion, and enhance overall European security and stability" (NATO 1999) . Even the EU's offer of a "reinforced relationship, based on shared democratic values" made in its key strategic document on Russia, also adopted in 1999, could be construed as less benign and more geopolitical in nature (European Council 1999) . Evidence of any such strategic purposiveness is, however, circumstantial.
It is more likely that the EU and NATO acted out of strategic naïveté rather than any grand strategic design -let alone one that was sufficiently coordinated to be termed genuinely transatlantic. Russia's actions in Crimea and Ukraine awoke both organisations (although the earlier intervention in Georgia should have done so) to the nature of the world on their littoral and beyond. The ending of the alleged "liberal delusion" also marked the end of the "strategic unconsciousness" of both organisations (Duke 2017) . More recently the often-held normative bias of the EU has given way to "principled pragmatism" which, according to the High Representative, will "guide our external action in the years ahead" (Global Strategy 2016, p. 8) . Prior to the adoption of the EUGS, in the High Representative's 2015 Strategy Review, reference was made on several occasions to the need for "nuanced realism" in the face of an increasingly complex world (EEAS 2015) . Although the precise meaning of both phrases is unclear, they nevertheless suggest a change from the normatively charged language that is commonly associated with the EU's external communication. Both documents were presaged by a review of the ENP which adopted a far more "pragmatic" tone, especially when it came to recognising that "not all partners aspire to EU rules and standards" and that there should therefore be "different ambitions, abilities and interests" (European Commission 2015, p. 4) .
Popular discontent within the EU also made the idea of promoting the Union as exemplar at the heart of its external engagement problematic.
The perceptions of the integration and security dilemmas from a Russian standpoint appear to differ between the internal and external audiences. For the internal audience the messaging is very much one of the classical security dilemma focussing, most recently, on how
Montenegro's accession to NATO 'deepens the dividing lines in Europe' (Grushko: 2016) .
Such representation also fits Putin's wish to portray a beleaguered Russia with a strong leader who not only defends the country's geostrategic interests, but is also determined to restore its international standing.
Externally, the messaging is more careful. Putin's 2014 Valdai speech, part of which is quoted above, is careful to single out the economic dimensions of the integration dilemma.
Although this is slightly disingenuous, since there are clear political considerations involved in the economic dimensions, it nevertheless reopens the question of whether a more nuanced approach to the impasse between the EU and NATO's relations with Russia, and vice versa, might not be addressed by more explicit recognition of the fact that while both organisations clearly suffer from an integration dilemma, the EU does not necessarily carry with it the baggage of a security dilemma other than via the largely overlapping membership of the two organisations.
Prospects for deconfliction
The EU primarily faces an integration dilemma due to the fact that the primary means of the contested engagement with its partners to the east, or Russia's "inner abroad", is heavily tradeoriented. There are of course important nuances: the EU is not exclusively a civilian power and there are security dimensions to the agreements with the eastern neighbours. The fact that the EU's security involvement in operations fall principally outside Europe and that a number have benefitted from Ukrainian and/or Russian contributions suggests that the security dilemma stems from more local or regional considerations and does not necessarily block security cooperation elsewhere. Further mutual engagement could therefore be approached by the EU as confidence building measures in the wider process or rebuilding relations with
Russia.
Much will also depend upon the extent to which there is interest on the part of the EU's Member
States to promote the Union's defence-related role based upon perceptions of conditionality to the American security guarantees provided through NATO. Efforts to bolster defence expenditure and capabilities within the EU and to assume a quasi "Article 5" role within the EU could ensnare the Union in something that looks far more like a security dilemma. But, for the moment, this is not the case.
NATO, by way of contrast, is engaged in something that bears a stronger resemblance to a classical security dilemma with efforts to bolster security by one party met by reciprocal (and Putin to exploit open differences (Turkey being of concern in this regard).
Greater differentiation would allow the EU to work on reducing its integration dilemma with Russia at several levels. At the broadest level the EU will have to enter into dialogue with The largely overlapping membership of the EU and NATO suggests that the engagement of the majority of the Union's members, who are also Alliance members, will help to create a more conducive atmosphere to change the zero-sum mindsets that underpin the security dilemma where the nature of any competition is far more intractable and less prone to agreement on power-sharing solutions. Importantly, any willingness to address the EU's integration dilemma with Russia would make it more difficult to Putin to maintain that the EU and NATO are part of a classical competition for international influence fuelled by an underpinning security dilemma.
Conclusions
This contribution builds upon Charap and Troitskiy's notion of the integration dilemma. They acknowledge that it is a variant of the security dilemma. We accept their argument that the EU and NATO suffer from an integration dilemma, but we note that they are of an essentially different nature. That of the EU is more closely associated with economic and trade competition, especially the proposed Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, while that of NATO is associated with cooperation on a broad range of security issues. While we acknowledge that there are clear nuances in this statement for both organisations, the underlying point is that the nature of the integration dilemmas differs.
Moreover, the "integration" that has been posited is not that of full membership, with the notable exception of the Western Balkans, some of whom are already EU and NATO members, while others are in the wings. This opens up the possibility of different forms of accommodation, short of full membership (or, "exclusivity", to use the terminology of the integration dilemma). Granted, it is precisely the current integration without membership that is the source of tension, but there are also important areas of exclusivity that risk becoming dogma (such as the incompatibility of EU and EEU membership). Efforts at accommodation, even initially symbolic, might provide positive messages for countries in the Caucasus, Central
Asia and even Turkey who are acutely aware of the integration dilemma and who will either exploit EU, NATO and Russian differences for their ends, or who will avoid any form of cooperation out of self-preservation.
The main conundrum in Charap and Troitskiy's integration dilemma is that they do not explore the linkages between the integration and security dilemmas or, critically, their differences. We argue that significant steps towards deconfliction might, however, be attained by the recognition that the EU and NATO both suffer from an integration dilemma with Russia, but both do not necessarily share a security dilemma with Russia. A security dilemma is in many ways more intractable, while creative approaches to the integration dilemma on the EU's part could begin to undermine the logic of the security dilemma.
A security dilemma, fuelled by realist perspectives, will be far harder to unravel. Russia has its largest military presence in Europe since the end of the Cold War and challenges to air and sea space are almost a daily occurrence. The presence of significant forces, including nuclear munitions, is also part of a deterrence posture that is at the heart of the security dilemma. Topdown approaches aimed at addressing the security dilemma are likely to be far less successful than bottom-up approaches aimed at addressing aspects of the integration dilemma.
It will admittedly take enormous vision and courage to move towards creative solutions that share power and influence, whilst respecting the concerns and desires of the EU and Russia's neighbours (and increasingly the neighbours-of-the-neighbours). Failure to make progress on this front will cause more uncertainty and make it problematic for those who have thus far avoided the Siren calls of exclusivity to do so in the future. It is in the interests of the EU and its members to insist that an integration dilemma does not become a security dilemma. It should also be in NATOs interest since any start to unravelling their security dilemma with Russia appears to lie in first addressing the EUs integration dilemma. In spite of evidence that EU-NATO cooperation is making tentative progress, distinctiveness may not be an entirely bad thing.
6 Brexit has also refuelled discussions about duplication, for example by reopening the option of an autonomous EU military command structure -a move the UK had worked against for a number of years (Biscop 2012 ).
7 The Eastern Partnership is a joint policy initiative launched at the Prague Summit in May 2009 that aims to deepen and strengthen relations between the EU and its six Eastern neighbours: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
8 By way of comparison, NATO's Exercise Steadfast Jazz in November 2013 involved 6,000 personnel.
9 NATO currently has four candidates for membership while the EU has five (albeit with no ambitions to consider further enlargement prior to 2019 in the latter's case).
10 There are three DCFTA countries to the EU's east (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) with the first two having entered into force in July 2016. Charap and Troitskiy (2013) are correct to argue that DCFTAs imply exclusivity in the sense that participation legally prohibits engagement in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) (as in the case of Armenia who is an EEU member). But, it is worth noting the voluntary nature of the Association Agreements with the EU and membership of the EEU, with a significant trimming of Putin's original ambition to create a "distinctive pole of influence in a multipolar world by reversing the 'civilised divorce' of the former Soviet republics of the USSR" (Popescu 2014, p. 7) .
